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Security Information

160 (OSI)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

13 November 1953

MEMORANDUM FOR: Mr. Helms

SUBJECT : Statement on Implications of Soviet Nuclear Weapons Tests During 1953

1. The IAC approved the release of the attached statement on Implications of Soviet Nuclear Weapons Tests During 1953 to selected governments [redacted]

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[redacted] on 13 October. On 22 October the NSC discussed the draft and authorized the DCI to release it to selected foreign governments after it had been amended and agreed to by the Chairman, ABC, the Secretary of State, and the Secretary of Defense. DCI obtained concurrences from the above officials in the final revised text in the period between 22 October and 12 November.

2. In accordance with discussions at this morning's Deputies' meeting, you are expected to make distribution promptly to those foreign services which you deem appropriate, advising me from time to time of the countries to which it has been delivered so that I may advise the Secretary of the IAC.

ROBERT AMORY, JR.
Deputy Director/Intelligence

O/DD/I
RAmoryJr/peb
13 November 1953

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IMPLICATIONS OF SOVIET NUCLEAR WEAPONS TESTS DURING 1953

1. Through high priority effort starting in 1945, the USSR has achieved a full-fledged nuclear weapons production program.

2. On the basis of information now available,

It is concluded that the Soviets can produce weapon types which utilize fission and thermonuclear reactions and that they now have the capability to produce weapons which vary in explosive power

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3. At present, the Soviet nuclear weapons stockpile is sufficiently large to cause substantial damage and loss of life if delivered on target in the nations of the Free World. These weapons can be transported by existing Soviet aircraft types within their range limitations.

4. The Soviet program will probably continue to expand. However, the total destructive power of the weapons which such a program can possibly produce will continue to be far smaller than that which can be unleashed by the Free World as retaliation to aggression.

13 Nov '53

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